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Introduction
[the United States Congress shall have power] To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.2
As enshrined in the Constitution, copyright in the United States has a singular, animating
purpose: to promote the progress of science and the useful arts. In order to accomplish that
objective, Congress was empowered to establish a limited monopoly in the form of a term of
protection during which the author held certain exclusive rights, such as reproduction and
distribution, over that work. These two interests – that of the public and of the author – serve as
the backbone of copyright law.
Within the last two decades, though, some industries have systematically undermined
both of those interests, redirecting the benefits of copyright towards themselves instead of the
intended beneficiaries: creators and the public. In examining how copyright has been flipped
against its purposes, this paper will largely focus on book, movie, and music publishing, as these
are the ones with business models that make them most susceptible to the abuses described.3
While the spotlighted industry actors may not represent the majority of entities in their respective
fields, they happen to be the ones with the greatest power, wealth, and influence, which means
that the impact of their actions is widespread and outsized. This power element makes their
redirection of copyright all the more troubling, as it benefits the already-privileged few over the
public and the majority of creators.
That central premise of this paper --- that copyright benefits the privileged and has been
used to suppress the uses it was intended to foster --- is not entirely new. It served as one of the
core disputes over the Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA), where opposition to extending
copyright’s term was diverse, coming from authors, economists, academics, historians, medical
professionals, non-profits, technology industry actors (e.g., Intel), and downstream-use for-profit
enterprises (e.g., film restorer).4 Significant statistical evidence already existed at that time
demonstrating that very few would benefit from such an extension while many would be harmed
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U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
These are the industries that rely heavily on individual use for profit. Other copyright industries --- dramatic works,
dance, art – make more income on broader uses, such as performance or display. The only other industry that has
similar characteristics is the computer gaming industry, but it has been excluded is because of the unique nature of
the industry, which is interactive and iterative.
4
Among the entities submitting briefs in Eldred v. Ashcroft (537 U.S. 186 (2003)) against the CTEA were: the
Association of American Physicians & Surgeons, National Humanities Alliance, Free Software Foundation, Hal
Roach Studios, Intel, the Organization of American Historians, the Internet Archive, and the Cato Institute.
Numerous economists, professors, and other individuals also filed briefs noting similar concerns.
3
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by it,5 and it was commonly known that a few powerful, wealthy interests were driving the
legislation6.
What makes the issue in this case different is that the CTEA was an act of Congress, a
deliberate decision by a governing body to place a small number of private interests over others.
Whether the decision was based on sound reasoning or not, Congress was acting within its
authority and it was on that basis that the Supreme Court ultimately upheld the legislation.7 In
contrast, most recent actions have been undertaken by private corporate actors in a manner that
arguably changes the meaning of copyright in a manner that infringes on Congress’ authority in
determining copyright’s purpose.
These actions include using technological controls or automation to preemptively cut off
fair uses, engaging in intimidation practices to thwart innovation or public use, implementing
automated takedowns, replacing ownership with rental, and limiting traditional pathways to
information for the poor. Each of these practices depresses innovation and fair uses, interfering
with the public purpose of copyright while also (in some cases) closing revenue opportunities for
authors, thereby frustrating the private purpose of copyright as well.
This article seeks to provide a brief historical overview of the motivations behind the
Copyright Clause, examine how technology has been used to unbalance copyright, analyze how
these changes negatively impact innovation and the public interest, and consider paths forward.
In this paper, the term “book” will be used as short-hand for all literary works excluding
computer programs, and the term “industry conglomerates” will stand for publishing entities +
the Authors Guild. The Authors Guild is included in this last category despite its representation
of authors because of its history of aligning itself with large-publisher interests. It represents less
than 5% of all United States authors,8 and by no means serves as an accurate reflection for all
5

Even as early as 1909, successful authors acknowledged in testimony that few authors would benefit from long
copyright terms (“One author per year produces a book which can outlive the forty-two year limit, and that is all. This
nation can not produce two authors per year who can create a book that will outlast forty-two years.”) To Amend and
Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: Hearing on S. 6330 and H.R. 19853 Before the S. Comm. on Patents and
the H. Comm. on Patents, conjointly, 59th Cong. 117 (1906) (testimony of Samuel L. Clemens). See also EDWARD
RAPPAPORT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-144 E, COPYRIGHT TERM EXTENSION: ESTIMATING THE ECONOMIC
VALUES 5–15 (1998). Based on a sampling of each type of work, he determined that approximately 3.8% of books
and 3.6% of music lost commercial viability each year, and movies had more variable rates, with percentages
changing drastically based on the era in which a movie was produced; Brief of George A. Akerlof et al. as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 2, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618).
6
See Arlen W. Langvardt & Kyle T. Langvardt, Unwise or Unconstitutional?: The Copyright Term Extension Act,
the Eldred Decision, and the Freezing of the Public Domain for Private Benefit, 5 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 193
(2004); Phil Galdston & David Wolfert, The Music Modernization Act Misses the Mark, VARIETY (Mar. 16, 2018),
https://variety.com/2018/biz/news/the-music-modernization-act-misses-the-mark-guest-column-1202728994/;
Jillian J. Dahrooge, The Real Slim Shady: How Spotify and Other Music Streaming Services Are Taking Advantage
of the Loopholes Within the Music Modernization Act, 21 J. HIGH TECH. L. 199, 236-8 (2021).
7
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
8
According to its annual report, the Authors Guild has 6,144 members. THE AUTHORS GUILD, AUTHORS GUILD
ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2020, at 11 (2020), https://www.authorsguild.org/wp-
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authors’ interests, as has been evidenced by opposing positions taken by other author groups
(e.g., Authors Alliance).
Copyright’s Purposes
At its heart, copyright serves two interests, the private interest of an author being compensated
for the creation of her work and the public interests of information access, preservation, and
innovation (the last in part through the availability of a public domain on which others can
build). While other interests and purposes are served by copyright – providing revenue and
employment to a growing number of industries,9 contributions to the nation’s treasury in the
form of taxes,10 and igniting imaginations, to name a few --- these two core purposes are the ones
that justify copyright’s existence at all. They are the two interests most commonly cited
throughout history and which are featured prominently in any proposed change to the nation’s
copyright laws. To fully understand why copyright settled on these two interests, it is necessary
to look at the environment in which copyright was born in the United States.
In colonial America, authors advocated fiercely for copyright laws distinctly different
from the earlier iterations that protected primarily publishers, not authors.11 They were anxious
to ensure their own livelihoods and reputations as well as to stop publishers from profiting from
their works without just payment.12 After hearing from authors, the Continental Congress
acknowledged the soundness of vesting exploitation rights of literary property in its author:
The committee . . . to whom were referred sundry papers and
memorials from different persons on the subject of literary
property, [are] persuaded that nothing is more properly a man’s
own than the fruit of his study, and that the protection and security
of literary property would greatly tend to encourage genius.13
content/uploads/2021/03/AuthorsGuild_AnnualReport_2021-final.pdf. The Bureau of Labor Statistics estimated the
number of writer and author jobs in 2019 as 131,200. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Writers and Authors,
OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK, https://www.bls.gov/ooh/media-and-communication/writers-andauthors.htm.
9
“[T]he core copyright industries of the United States–those industries whose primary purpose is to create, produce,
distribute, or exhibit copyright materials–provide significant value added to U.S. gross domestic product (“GDP”);
real growth which outpaces the rest of the economy; an increasing number of high-paying jobs; and substantial
foreign sales and exports, surpassing many industry sectors.” STEPHEN E. SIWEK, COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES IN THE
U.S. ECONOMY: THE 2018 REPORT 3 (December 2018), https://iipa.org/files/uploads/2018/12/2018CpyrtRptFull.pdf.
10
Id. at 18.
11
Oren Bracha, The Ideology of Authorship Revisited: Authors, Markets, and Liberal Values in Early American
Copyright, 118 YALE L.J. 186 (2008).
12
OREN BRACHA, OWNING IDEAS: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 1790–1909,
at 40 (2016). An image of the Joel Barlow letter referenced can be found here: http://
www.copyrighthistory.org/cam/tools/request/showRepresentation?id=representation_us_1783b.
13
24 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 326 (1783).
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and recommended that individual states enact copyright laws that provided authors or publishers
least 14 years of protection for published works.14 All states except Delaware enacted such laws,
though the terms varied, and most states chose to invest copyright in authors only, excluding the
publishers from any explicit interest.15 In doing so, lawmakers appeared to recognize that vesting
copyright in publishers would not meet the stated intention of supporting creators in making a
living from their works. After all, there was already a long history of piracy by publishers,16 and
giving them further rights would have simply encouraged acts designed to decrease rather than
increase author income. By granting copyright to authors, states could at least provide authors
with more leverage in initial negotiation with publishers.
The public interest served as a counterbalance to private rights and was as relevant to the
copyright formulation as author ownership rights.17 Part of this interest was seen as
complementary to authors’ rights, as giving authors an economic right was thought to encourage
the creation of new works.18 As each new work was seen as a new commodity (in the form of
knowledge) for society, legislation to incentivize such creation was, therefore, in the public
interest.19 In contrast, the other aspect of public interest was in direct opposition to the private
interest. It was the need for an informed citizenry, made possible only through widespread
information dissemination, an essential goal if a democracy were ever to function well.
Correspondence among the Founders illustrated the awareness of the contradictions in purpose:

14

Id.
“[T]welve of the thirteen states (all except Delaware) had used the Statute of Anne as a model for enacting state
copyright statutes during the period of the Confederation — from 1783 to 1786 — shortly before the Constitutional
Convention in 1787.” Lyman Ray Patterson, Understanding the Copyright Clause, 47 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A.
365, 374 (2000)
16
Bodo Balazs, Coda: A Short History of Book Piracy, in MEDIA PIRACY IN EMERGING ECONOMIES, Social Science
Research Council 408-411 (Joe Karaganis ed., 2011). See also, Oren Bracha, United States copyright, 1672-1909, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT LAW 335, 338-339 (Isabella Alexander & H. Tomas
Gomez-Arostegui eds., Edward Elgar Pub. 2016).
17
“These twenty-four words [of the Copyright Clause] contain three ideas fundamental to a free society and are used
to limit the copyright power: copyright is not to be used for censorship (because copyright is to promote learning),
the public domain (because copyright is limited to new works for a limited time),7 and public access (because
publication is a condition for statutory copyright).” Patterson, supra note 15 at 367–68 (2000).
18
“The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the
conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare
through the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’ ” Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
See also Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197 (1996); Martha
Woodmansee, On the Author Effect: Recovering Collectivity, in THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP
(Woodmansee & Jaszi eds., Duke Univ. Pr. 1994) (noting that any work of authorship is a collaborative effort,
building on others’ work).
19
See Hon. Richard A. Posner, Do We Have Too Many Intellectual Property Rights?, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L.
REV. 173, 177 (2005). (“If you had a situation in which anyone was free to come along and harvest the crops that
you had planted, you would not have any incentive to plant. If we want people to invest for the future, to we have to
give them property rights.”)
15
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Jefferson's writings reveal his deeply held view that a copyright
monopoly posed a threat to the dissemination of creative works
and knowledge to the public, although he also recognized that
granting a copyright monopoly would incentivize the creation of
copyrighted works. Jefferson's fears about the dangers of
monopolies were shared by Madison, who was a driving force
behind the inclusion of the Copyright Clause in the Constitution
and was likely significantly responsible for its final wording.
Madison thought it was vitally important to protect the value of the
diffusion of knowledge by limiting the government's power to
grant a copyright monopoly. Madison and Jefferson both agreed
that this protection was a necessary prerequisite for effective
republican self-government.20
While the Continental Congress did not explicitly include public interest concerns in its
copyright recommendations, most of the states that adopted legislation, both before and after the
recommendation, did. Massachusetts, for example, adopted a deposit requirement, and other
states adopted language that signaled that the author’s interest was valued only insofar as it met
the purpose of being beneficial to the public.21 An example of this public orientation comes from
New Hampshire’s preamble to their early copyright laws:
As the improvement of knowledge, the progress of civilization, and the
advancement of human happiness, greatly depend on the efforts of ingenious
persons in the various arts and sciences; as the principal encouragement such
persons can have to make great and beneficial exertions of this nature, must
consist in the legal security of the fruits of their study and industry to themselves;
and as such security is one of the natural rights of all men, there being no property
more peculiarly a man’s own than that which is produced by the labour of his
mind: Therefore, to encourage the publication of literary productions,
honorary and beneficial to the public.22 (emphasis added)
The Founders also adopted this public purpose in the drafting of the Copyright Clause in
the Constitution. The language in the Constitution not only reflected the intended balance
20

Susanna Frederick Fischer, Threatening the Founding Ideal of A Republic of Letters: An Assessment of the
Supreme Court's Copyright Decisions over the First Decade of the Twenty-First Century, 5 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J.
205, 207 (2011).
21
COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 1783-1906, at 11-31 (Thorvald Solberg ed., rev. 2d ed. 1906).
22
WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 21 (2000), http://digital-law-online.info/patry/patry3.html
(referencing the full text in COPYRIGHT OFFICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS: LAWS PASSED IN
THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1783 RELATING TO COPYRIGHT 8 (rev. ed. 1973).

6

between the two interests, but its phrasing also made clear which of those interests should win
out should there be a conflict.23 The purpose of copyright was the “progress of science and the
useful arts.” The private rights attendant to copyright were in service to that goal.
In practice, the tension between the stated interests was also evident from the start. The
nation’s residents were eager for news, educational writings, and reading materials, but it was
costly and time consuming for publishers to obtain rights for all the materials desired. Publishers,
therefore, relied heavily on unauthorized copies to meet readers’ needs.24 The country’s printing
presses used much of what they needed without payment and viewed this activity as being
natural and beneficial to their communities and their own survival.25 This strong interest from the
reading public as well as commercial actors in unauthorized reproduction in turn led lawmakers
to draft legislation that limited author protections with an eye towards keeping presses running
and meeting its nation’s informational needs. Unsurprisingly, then, the laws initially passed
protected only United States’ authors and then, once foreign authors gained protection, only
works that were manufactured or printed in the country.26
In other words, when presented with a choice between the public interest and the
author’s, Congress acted in a manner consistent with the priority of rights expressed in the
Copyright Clause. It protected the nation’s interests first. The author’s interest was secondary. As
time progressed and the consequences of granting greater deference to one interest over the other
became less stark, Congress extended protection to a greater number of works, a larger range of
authors, and more uses.
While research has since shown that some of the assumptions behind the private interest
purpose of the Copyright Clause and subsequent legislation were faulty, the principles
themselves still meaningfully serve the purposes intended. For example, most authors clearly
require no compensation as incentive to generate creative works,27 as illustrated in the
23

RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 193 (1968).
Hall et al., Practices of Reading, in A HISTORY OF THE BOOK IN AMERICA. VOLUME 1: THE COLONIAL BOOK IN
THE ATLANTIC WORLD, 377-410 (Hugh Amory & David D. Hall eds., 2007) (describing reader interests and types of
materials in demand); Spoo, infra note 25 (detailing the history of piracy in the early American history).
25
ROBERT SPOO, WITHOUT COPYRIGHTS: PIRACY, PUBLISHING, AND THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 20-21 (2013).
26
35 Stat. 1075 (1909). See also The Manufacturing Clause: Copyright Protection to the Foreign Author, 50
COLUM. L. REV. 686 (1950).
27
Rebecca Giblin, Reimagining Copyright’s Duration, in WHAT IF WE COULD REIMAGINE COPYRIGHT? 194 (Rebecca
Giblin & Kimberlee Weatherall eds., 2017); Mark A. Lemley, IP in a World Without Scarcity, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV.
460 (on how people create without any economic incentive); James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement, 66
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 45-46 (2003). David A. Simon, Culture, Creativity, & Copyright, 29 CARDOZO ARTS
& ENT. L.J. 279, 281 (2011); William Fisher, The Implications for Law of User Innovation, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1417,
1432 (2010); Roberta R. Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation: The Intrinsic Dimension of the Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1945, 1951–62 (2006); Lydia Pallas Loren, The Pope's Copyright? Aligning Incentives with Reality
by Using Creative Motivation to Shape Copyright Protection, 69 LA. L. REV. 1, 8 (2008); David A. Simon, In
Search of (Maintaining) the Truth: The Use of Copyright Law by Religious Organizations, 16 MICH. TELECOMM. &
TECH. L. REV. 355, 360–76 (2010); Roger Syn, Copyright God: Enforcement of Copyright in the Bible and
Religious Works, 14 REGENT U. L. REV. 1, 13–15, 27–28 (2002); Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use
and Marketplace Assumptions, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513, 526 (2009).
24
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proliferation of creative content on the web such as photos, videos, blogs, fanfiction, and
publicly posted artwork. More creative content is now generated outside of traditional publishing
streams and revenue streams than within them.
However, it is undeniable that some works would not come into existence but for the
relationship between copyright protection and the path to traditional publishing. Some authors
would not have the time, energy, or resources to create if they had to find other ways to
financially support themselves and their dependents, and publishers would have little reason to
invest in works that others could use freely. Even though these authors are in the minority of
creators, outnumbered by those posting freely, society arguably would be weaker without them.
After all, much of the nation’s most-taught literature28 came about only after copyright protection
was established. Some of the works themselves were directly shaped by compensation, such as
novels that developed in part into substantial works because of the rewards that came from serial
publication.29 Though copyright alone may not have caused these works to be created or
published30 --- there were many other influences on the rise of writing and publishing in the
guises of technology, lower cost publication materials, spread of literacy, increasing wages – it
still served as a meaningful element in fostering an environment for greater production.
How Technology Changed Copyright Practices
[A]n author who publishes his or her writing and claims statutory
copyright protection should not be free to play yo-yo with the
public's right of access to a work of learning, because control of
access is the essence of censorship. The right of public access, in
short, is an implied condition for copyright protection just as
originality is an express condition.31
The hallmark of the current intellectual property era is that technologies change rapidly, and
legislatively-determined rights, like copyright, are slow to evolve. That puts the balance of
copyright at risk, as technology has morphed so much more quickly than either Congress or the
courts have been able to react. The inability for law to match real-time activities means that bad
28

https://www.goodreads.com/list/show/478.Required_Reading_in_High_School
Robert L. Patten, Pickwick Papers and the Development of Serial Fiction, 61 RICE UNIVERSITY STUDIES, Number
2 (1975) (describing how serial publications produced more financial rewards and incentives for publishers).
30
Though many of the titles still assigned in K-12 classes were indeed written only after copyright laws were
enacted, there is reason to doubt that copyright was the only factor. Data from Our World in Data
(https://ourworldindata.org/books) shows that various nations saw levels of publication pre-copyright that were not
reached again until long after copyright laws were enacted. For example, the UK produced more new book titles in
the mid-1600s than they did until the mid-1900s. The world is also well aware of respected artists and authors that
created long-lasting works prior to any copyright laws. Shakespeare, da Vinci, and all of the artists from the
Renaissance come to mind.
31
Patterson, supra note 15 at 372–73.
29

8

actors can act use new technologies to disrupt the balance of copyright long enough to do lasting
damage before government acts. By the time legislation or a court opinion rules against the actor,
the technology has already been replaced with something new, enabling the actor (or new actors)
to expand on the damage in a different way or to choose an alternative angle of attack. In this
way, bad actors manage to stay one step ahead of the law.
Such actors exist on both sides of copyright’s balance, and this type of exploitative
behavior has been undertaken in the past by members of the public as well as by copyright
owners. Mass piracy, such as that undertaken by some of Napster’s users,32 is an example of
actions unbalancing copyright against its private purpose of compensating authors for their work.
Technology, because of how quickly it can move files, enabled faster and more numerous
transactions than was possible with analog works, making piracy easier and, in some cases,
highly lucrative.33
On the flip side, technology has been used by copyright owners to retain all the
advantages of copyright while evading the corresponding public responsibilities intended to
come with those benefits. Copyright, which protects an intangible work, is by definition format
neutral, as intangibility means that form is lacking. While format neutrality was respected in the
analog world – a work was viewed as the same and worthy of the same protection whether in
papyri, print, or microform34 – technology upended this core principle.35 Today, through intense
lobbying of Congress by private rights owners,36 there are rights or remedies that attach solely to
specific formats, even if the work in question and the intended use of it are the same as they
would have been in print.
Dissatisfied with the legal mechanisms already in place to fight piracy (e.g., infringement
remedies), private corporations pushed for extraordinary protection for works packaged in digital
formats such as the anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (see
infra).37 This fear of piracy led to the adoption of strategies that assume that every member of the
32

Jennifer Norman, Staying Alive: Can the Recording Industry Survive Peer-to-Peer?, 26 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 371
(2003)
33
STEVEN WITT, HOW MUSIC GOT FREE (2015) (describing the earliest pirating efforts in music and movie DVDs
and CDs).
34
During the first couple of decades in the 1900s, there was some dispute about format and the application of
copyright. The format in question was that of piano rolls, and the question was whether music in such a form
infringed copyright if permission from the copyright owner had not been obtained. See White-Smith Music Pub. Co.
v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908) as an example. But that line of reasoning has not been repeated and later statutory
enactments made clear that copyright protects a work, regardless of format.
35
Congress’ decision to upend neutrality was a conscious one. “In explaining this departure, the Commerce
Committee notes that ‘the digital environment poses a unique threat to the rights of copyright owners, and as such,
necessitates protection against devices that undermine copyright interests.’” David Nimmer, Appreciating
Legislative History the Sweet and Sour Spots of the DMCA's Commentary, 23 Cardozo L. Rev. 909, 920 (2002)
citing the Report of the House Commerce Comm., H.R. Rep. No.105-551, Part 2, (2d Sess. 1998) at 25.
36
Id.
37
Over four days of testimony, copyright industries repeatedly cited unproven harm caused by piracy; piracy itself
was clearly proven, but harm (e.g., that those consuming pirated works would have purchased them otherwise) was
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public is a pirate and cannot be controlled without industry action. This means that most
solutions implemented are prior restraints on behavior, eliminating opportunities for public
interests to act, leaving only private interests in control. Worse, those private interests shaping
the nation’s laws are not necessarily those protected by the Copyright Act; instead, it is often a
publishers’ private interest that shapes practice, and any practices adopted often survive even
after having shown to fail in their purpose38. In other words, the sacrifice of the public interest
remains even if the private interest is not well served.
While acknowledging that the balance of copyright can be upset in either direction, this
article will discuss almost exclusively the problem of unbalancing of copyright in favor of
private interests. This is for three reasons. The first is that the unbalancing of copyright in the
other direction, against private interests, only exists where the authors’ private interest in earning
income for her work is compromised. The poster child for this type of imbalance is piracy, and
that issue, mostly in music and movies, has been covered extensively. By the early 1990s, over
40 studies had been conducted, some showing a positive effect on sales and other negative
effects. Scholars looking at the body of literature as a whole found that even where effects were
identified, some were negligible, and “an effect cannot be proven beyond reasonable statistical
doubt.”39
Piracy undoubtedly exists, but it is likely impossible to prove that it is the cause of any
industry-wide decline in paid use. Even in eras where piracy is high and use low, industries
would need to resolve two basic assumptions. The first is to account for the weight of other
factors. Take broadcast television in illustration. Viewership might decline as piracy increases
but other plausible factors include the proliferation of other entertainment sources both free (e.g.,
YouTube) and paid (e.g., Netflix), changes in viewer interests, and changes in demographics.

not. NII Copyright Protection Act of 1995 (Part 1) Before the H. Comm. on Judiciary, Subcom. on Courts and
Intellectual Property (Nov. 15, 1995); NII Copyright Protection Act of 1995 (Part 2) Before H. Comm on Judiciary,
Subcom. on Courts and Intellectual Property (Feb. 7-8, 1996; National Information Infrastructure Copyright
Protection Act of 1995 Before S. Comm. on Judiciary (May 7, 1996).
38
John T. Holland, Making Money Instead of Excuses: A Market-Based Alternative to the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act That Protects Copyrights Without Diminishing Expression, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 279, 292-4
(2009) (explaining why the anti-circumvention provisions in the DMCA were ineffective). See also, WILLIAM F.
PATRY, HOW TO FIX COPYRIGHT 33, 72–73 (2011) (giving examples of where legislators are hoodwinked by disproven
industry statistics or where post-legislation examination indicates that assumptions underlying the legislation were
false. In the latter case, legislators still do not reverse course). See also IAN HARGREAVES, Enforcement and Disputes,
in DIGITAL OPPORTUNITY: A REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GROWTH (2011),
https://assets.publishing.service. gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/32563/ipreviewfinalreport.pdf; THE SOC. SCI. RESEARCH COUNCIL, MEDIA PIRACY IN EMERGING ECONOMIES (Joe Karaganis ed.,
2011), https://www.ssrc.org/publications/view/C4A69 B1C-8051-E011-9A1B-001CC477EC84/
39
João Pedro Quintais & Joost Poort, The Decline of Online Piracy: How Markets - Not Enforcement - Drive Down
Copyright Infringement, 34 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 807, 815–16 (2019) citing Wojciech Hardy et al., Friends or Foes?
A Meta-Analysis of the Link Between “Online Piracy” and Sales of Cultural Goods 2 (Univ. Warsaw Fac. Econ.
Sci. Working Paper No. 23, 2015).
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Even if all other factors are eliminated or diminished, the industry would then need to
verify that those consuming pirated goods would have purchased copies at the offered price.
However, it is more likely that what they would find is that some may have insufficient financial
means to purchase, others may live in regions where a legal version is unavailable, and still
others may well lose interest if a product is available only at a cost. This last category may
indeed be the most challenging to overcome, as everyone has probably experienced this
phenomenon in their lifetime, picking up a free gift that they would not have purchased.
Correlation is simply not the same as causation, and for all the claims that piracy harms
sales, analyses prove that if harm exists, it is not accurately represented by the data that
industries present.40 Further, artists themselves have recognized instances where piracy has
increased their sales.41 In short, without proof of causation of harm to the private interest, and
therefore, accurate identification of a problem, a “solution” is premature.
The second reason to focus on bad industry actors is that the public purpose in copyright
is the interest given the most weight in the Constitution so any diminution of its strength is of
particular concern. In the case of harm to the public interest, the objective proof is set forth in the
following subsections, making the issue ripe for discussion.
The last reason is that a small number of industry actors hold such power that they can
unilaterally impact both the market and the public interest. In comparison, when members of the
public act (e.g., use of Pirate Bay) to unbalance copyright, multiple actors have to be willing to
act to do any damage (e.g., someone has to upload a work, and others who would otherwise buy
the work would have to download it). When a powerful publisher acts, it can singlehandedly,
unilaterally cut off any other routes and dictate all terms. It is possible to craft effective solutions
to prevent harmful actions of a small number of multi-national corporations in a way that it is not
practically possible to do for large populations where its members act independently.
Licensing
While some publishers still make titles available in multiple formats, offering any given book in
print and online, others only offer licensed digital formats. By replacing sales with licensing,
these publishers have eliminated copy ownership and all of the alienation rights attendant to it.
To fully understand how disruptive and harmful this shift can be, one need only consider what
types of public benefits alienation generate. It creates inventory for second-hand markets such as
eBay, thrift shops, and used bookstores. It allows people to donate reading materials to libraries
or charities so that those unable to afford the works can still access them. It enables friends to
40

IAN HARGREAVES, supra note 38 at ¶ 8.9 (finding no evidence supporting the claims of high losses because of
digital piracy); SOC. SCI. RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 38 at 4 (noting “a serious and increasingly sophisticated
industry research enterprise embedded in a lobbying effort with a historically very loose relationship to evidence”).
41
PATRY, supra note 38 at 157-158. See also commentary by Neil Gaiman on how his views on piracy changed, from
fear of loss of income to recognizing that both piracy and free access had led to increased sales
https://zine.openrightsgroup.org/features/2011/video:-an-interview-with-neil-gaiman
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lend their books to each other, for libraries to lend books to their communities, and for one
generation to pass down their favorite titles to the next generation. Now imagine what happens if
none of these actions are permitted.
Before examining licensing harms in greater detail, it is important to mark the scope of
criticism. With all the harm that licensing can do when it replaces ownership, not all licenses
have this purpose. In fact, licenses of copyrighted works themselves are not inherently harmful,
as there are many that have beneficial and unique aspects beyond what is traditionally conveyed
through copyright. Some aggregator databases or streaming services, for example, can give users
and libraries options to access large quantities of information or services that would not be
affordable through purchase. In many cases (particularly for the individual user), that type of
expansive, temporary access may bring a greater benefit than purchasing a smaller, permanent
collection. Short-term licenses for materials that libraries and individuals have no interest in
owning (e.g., many multiple copies when a best-seller is released) also may be better met by
short-term rentals than long-term purchases. Since the intent of access in these databases and
their associated licenses is very different from a traditional acquisition, limiting rights in
exchange seems to present a legitimate, conscious, mutually beneficial trade-off.
However, licensing practices for electronic materials that seek to replace a standard
acquisition with a restrictive lease are harmful. They disable societal guarantees, such as
preservation, meaning that content can disappear with no warning. They often charge higher
prices for works while conveying fewer rights, infringe on privacy, and decimate industries and
public services reliant on alienation principles.
It is this second category of licenses that will be the focus of this section.
Licensing - Individuals
Publishers licensing e-books to individuals often engage in objectively harmful practices
including deception, loss of privacy, and loss of alienation. Amazon will be used for purposes of
illustration in this subsection.
The deception comes in the characterization of a license as a sale, when a license by
definition is only a lease where the original owner retains rights over use. For example, where
Amazon offers books in multiple formats, each selection appears to allow the user to buy the
book regardless of format. Any print edition (e.g., paperback or hardback) will offer a “Buy
Now” button, and any digital edition (e.g., Kindle or Audible editions) will say “Buy Now with
1-Click”. What does not appear throughout a digital purchase, though, is a notice that ownership
is never transferred and the “buyer” has not actually purchased anything. They have licensed a
book and own nothing. While the publisher/distributor is well aware of the differing
consequences of each format’s transaction, the wording misleads the user into thinking that the
formats are simply alternative containers for the same content. They may not realize what rights
they have lost if they choose a digital format.
12

Those aware that the formats are subject to different terms can identify the unspoken
costs of the digital format if they search for the license terms. A print book is owned and
therefore, all the rights of ownership, including alienation, attach to it. The owner can lend the
book to others, resell it, take it apart (e.g., incorporated into artwork), donate it, or pass it on to
someone else upon death. In contrast, Amazon’s terms for their Kindle format42 limits the
buyer’s use of an e-book only to types of devices and apps that Amazon recognizes (see
italicized wording below), prohibits reconveyance (see bolded, underlined language below), and
requires use to be personal and non-commercial (see underlined language below).
Use of Kindle Content. Upon your download of Kindle Content
and payment of any applicable fees (including applicable taxes),
the Content Provider grants you a non-exclusive right to view, use,
and display such Kindle Content an unlimited number of times,
solely through a Reading Application or as otherwise permitted as
part of the Service, solely on the number of Supported Devices
specified in the Kindle Store, and solely for your personal, noncommercial use. Kindle Content is licensed, not sold, to you by the
Content Provider. The Content Provider may include additional
terms for use within its Kindle Content. Those terms will also
apply, but this Agreement will govern in the event of a conflict.
Some Kindle Content, such as interactive or highly formatted
content, may not be available to you on all Reading Applications.
Amazon’s Kindle does allow for lending for some titles, but it not apparent from the initial
transaction which titles are lendable and which are not. While a user can find the information
if they know to look for it, it is buried.43 Also, since any information provided on lendability
can change throughout the course of a license, that initial disclosure carries very little
meaning beyond what the user can do at that exact moment if they choose to license the
book. 44 Even where a title is lendable, it may only be lendable once. While the decision on
lending is not Amazon’s responsibility, as that is set by the publisher of any given title, the
opaqueness surrounding lendability is.
Further, the user gives up privacy rights without ever having consented to such loss of
privacy.

42

https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=200771440 (last visited April 30, 2021).
One can find the information on lendability by following the steps described at https://bookriot.com/how-to-lenda-kindle-book/ (last visited July 1, 2021).
44
See user thread on lendable books becoming unlendable at
https://www.amazonforum.com/s/question/0D54P00006zIAl2SAG/why-are-so-many-books-no-longer-loanable
(last visited July 1, 2021)
43
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Information Provided to Amazon. The Software will provide
Amazon with information about use of your Reading Application
and its interaction with Kindle Content and the Service (such as
last page read, content archiving, available memory, up-time, log
files, and signal strength).
Among the many datapoints Amazon gathers, it knows what any given user has read, how many
times, what she has highlighted or bookmarked, the speed at which she reads, and the subjects
that interest her.45 While some of this activity could produce effects favorable to the user, such as
better recommendations on new materials or improvements to Kindle functionality, it is not
necessary to track every Kindle action to reach these benefits. Other e-book vendors or platforms
vary in the type of information they collect, but all collect information beyond what is necessary
to give the user meaningful access to the book and associated functionalities.46
Last, Amazon can change the terms at any time, without notice. This includes unilaterally
retracting the book, an option that it has exercised in the past.47
Changes to Service; Amendments. We may change, suspend, or
discontinue the Service, in whole or in part, at any time without
notice. We may amend any of this Agreement's terms at our sole
discretion by posting the revised terms on the Amazon.com
website. Your continued use of the Software or any aspect of the
Service after the effective date of the revised Agreement terms
constitutes your acceptance of the terms.
The consequences of these licensing practices for individuals, then, mean not only the eventual
disintegration of second-hand markets and less sharing of information, but also the loss of
individual control, choice, and privacy.
Licensing – Libraries

45

Chaim Gartenberg, Why Amazon is tracking every time you tap your Kindle, VERGE (Jan. 31, 2020),
https://www.theverge.com/2020/1/31/21117217/amazon-kindle-tracking-page-turn-taps-e-reader-privacy-policysecurity-whispersync. Note that it is possible to ask Amazon for a record of the data it has collected on you
(https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=GXPU3YPMBZQRWZK2) but there does not
appear to be a way to erase that data without deleting the entire account. Even then, unless the user lives in a country
with strict privacy laws, Amazon has no obligation to erase information it has already collected.
46
See Overdrive’s privacy policy, http://company.cdn.overdrive.com/policies/privacy-policy.htm; Adobe Digital
Edition’s privacy policy, https://www.adobe.com/privacy/policies/ade.html. Additional privacy reviews of reading
applications can be found at Common Sense at https://privacy.commonsense.org/
47
Brad Stone, Amazon Erases Orwell Books from Kindle, N.Y TIMES, July 17, 2009,
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/18/technology/companies/18amazon.html.
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Libraries are entities designed to serve the public interest of copyright, by preserving and
providing access to information to current and future generations regardless of the requestor’s
wealth. For that reason, as troubling as the consequences of licensing are for individual
purchasers, licensing practices applied to libraries can result in unique societal harm.
Not only do the general harms of licensing over ownership (e.g. elimination of alienation)
apply to libraries, but publishers have layered on additional burdens when a library acquires
content. Common publisher practices include refusing to sell materials to libraries, “taxing”
library acquisitions, prohibiting activities that fall within a library’s primary purpose (acquiring
content, lending, preservation, ILL) and using changing technologies (i.e., digital format) to
disable actions that were legal in an analog world.
In a digital world, publishers can control not only production but distribution, and
through that power, some publishers have denied libraries access to content completely,
something that was not possible in an analog world. In print, in the highly unlikely case of a
bookstore declining to sell a title to a library, there would undoubtedly be alternative suppliers
without such objections. With the digital format --- that same title simply wrapped in a digital
container --- a publisher can outright refuse to sell or license the title to a library at all or require
its distributors to do the same. Amazon, Simon & Schuster, Macmillan, and some textbook
publishers serve as examples, each of which has refused to license e-books to libraries at various
points in time.48
Publishers have not been reticent about the rationale for their actions: private profit.
The growth in our digital business gives us access to a greater
number of students in any given classroom and generates new
sources of revenue from our existing adoption customers. In
contrast to print publications, our digital products cannot be resold
or transferred. We therefore realize revenue from every end user.49
Even when publishers are willing to license to libraries, the differential pricing is often
crushing. Many publishers charge libraries several times more than individuals for e-book

Geoffrey Fowler, Want to borrow that e-book from the library? Sorry, Amazon won’t let you, WASHINGTON POST
(Mar. 12, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/03/10/amazon-library-ebook-monopoly/ Jordan
Crook. See also AM. LIBRARY ASS’N, COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS 2 (2019),
http://www.ala.org/news/sites/ala.org.news/files/content/mediapresscenter/CompetitionDigitalMarkets.pdf
(describing Amazon’s recent decision to stop selling e-books to libraries); Letter from SPARC to Assistant Attorney
General Makan Delrahim, https://sparcopen.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/DOJ_Filing_08142019830.pdf (Aug.
14, 2019) (describing textbook publishers’ refusals to license works to libraries); Carnegie Public Library,
https://www.carnegie.lib.oh.us/content/did-you-know-your-library-cant-buy-ebooks-many-publishers (while now
outdated, this site lists publishers that did, at the time of posting, refuse to license content to libraries).
49
SPARC, supra note 48 at 11 (citing Cengage, Cengage Learning Holdings II, Inc.: Annual Report for Fiscal Year
Ended March 31, 2019, at 6).
48
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licenses,50 despite the fact that the content is exactly the same. Adding to the harm to the public
interest, the licenses often come with restrictions whether in time or number of uses, meaning
that a library would have to pay that artificially elevated price many times over for continued use
of the same title. Funds that could have purchased 100 print books may only be able to license a
dozen of those same titles in e-book format. Exactly the same content, but in one form (digital),
less content for the community, no rights of preservation, and restricted rights of access.
These restrictions on library use are even more troubling because they run counter to the
historical reality of public use. For instance, publishers such as HarperCollins unilaterally
decided that e-books licensed to libraries would expire after 26 uses,51 despite the ease of
verifying actual library usage where (1) the vast majority of books last significantly longer than
that 26 uses through standard maintenance and repair and (2) libraries replace only a very small
number of titles52. The publisher-set restriction is an artificial one, forcing purchase for
continued use in one format when there would be no legitimate equivalent forced sale for its
analog formats.
The same stark contrast is apparent in additional ways. Virtually all libraries have
physical books in their stacks that are as old as their own existences, spanning decades if not
centuries. They were obtained through gift or for a one-time fee and have been used continually
since. The only “added” costs during the years of ownership are in repair and maintenance. In

“Abusive pricing for libraries also is typical from the Big 5 publishers. For example, The Codebreakers by David
Kahn and published by Simon & Schuster was quoted for $59.99 as an eBook for a consumer purchase8—which
means lifetime access. By contrast, the price to 3 libraries for the very same eBook is $239.99—and this is for one
copy (i.e., it can be loaned out to one person at a time, simulating the print loan model) and lasts for only two years.
If a library wanted access for four years, it would pay $479.98. If the library wanted access for 20 years, it would
pay a staggering $2,399.90—for one copy, lending that eBook to one person at a time.” AM. LIBRARY ASS’N, supra
note 48 at 2-3; Devin Coldewey, Necessary Evil? Random House Triples Prices of Library E-Books, TECHCRUNCH
(Mar. 2, 2012), https://techcrunch.com/2012/03/02/necessary-evil-random-house-triples-prices-of-library-e-books/.
This practice has long been in place, as differential pricing was already raised as a concern during the hearings over
the 1909 Act. See To Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: Hearing on S. 6330 and H.R. 19853
Before the S. Comm. On Patents and the H. Comm. on Patents, conjointly, 59th Cong. 75 (1906) (Testimony of
William P. Cutter, Secretary, Library Copyright League; Copyright Law Revision, Part 1: Hearing on H.R. 2223
Before the H. Sub. Comm. On Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 94th Congress 190 (1976) (Testimony of Edmon Low, representing six library associations). Please note
that these are costs related to books that are used one person at a time; it does not analyze costs that may be added
due to greater access such as unlimited simultaneous access, as the expanded scope makes this fundamentally
different from borrowing a print equivalent, which by definition cannot be accessed by multiple people
simultaneously.
51
Julie Bosman, Publisher Limits Shelf Life for Library E-Books, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2011,
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/15/business/media/15libraries.html.
52
Library integrated library systems (ILSes) are typically set not to preserve identifiable circulation data
permanently but they do generally record how many times an item has been checked out. As a former ILS
administrator and law library director, I had access to such records, and every library where I have worked had
works that circulated hundreds if not thousands of times without replacement (e.g., Bluebook).
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contrast, that same title in digital format may expire after a year or two, and a library has to repay
for access to the same content.
Macmillan’s decision, now reversed, to limit the copies of e-books a library could
license, regardless of how large the community that library served, was based on the belief that
readers would buy the books if the alternative was to stand in a virtual line in the form of a long
library waiting list.53 While this assumption was perhaps true for some readers, what the
publisher ignored in its calculation was that many other readers lacked the funds to purchase
books at all.
Beyond overtly profit-motivated structures, many license terms also restrict what libraries
can do with licensed content, undermining some of the rights explicitly granted to libraries in
§108 (e.g., interlibrary loan, preservation copies) of the copyright code. Again, because use is
governed by licenses and escapes the definition of ownership, §108 does not apply to licensed
content. The harms caused by such terms echo throughout society. By limiting what can be
loaned through interlibrary loan, all communities face an unnecessary loss of access to a broader
range of materials than any given library can acquire. And, in preventing preservation, there is no
reliable way to ensure that knowledge available today will still be verifiable tomorrow.
As noted earlier, loss of ownership for individuals has the downstream effect of crippling
secondary markets and second-hand charitable uses. But loss of ownership to libraries means the
eventual loss of information access to current and future generations. Prior to the digital age,
libraries would purchase books. If a library’s budget faced cuts in a given year, its community
retained access to all of the content purchased in the decades or centuries before, even if it could
not buy new content. With the shift to digital licenses instead of sales, a budget cut can mean that
the library and its community loses access to all of that license’s content, no matter what was
spent in the years before. For society more broadly, materials available only through license may
disappear entirely if a publisher goes out of business or otherwise decides that maintaining the
records is no longer in its business interests.54
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)
Until the adoption of the DMCA, Congress had generally remained faithful to both objectives of
the Copyright Clause “by regulating the use of information--not the devices or means by which
the information is delivered or used by information consumers--and by ensuring an appropriate
balance between the interests of copyright owners and information users.”55 The anticircumvention and copyright management information provisions of the DMCA consciously
53

Lynn Neary, You May Have To Wait To Borrow A New E-Book From The Library, NPR (Nov. 1, 2019),
https://www.npr.org/2019/11/01/775150979/you-may-have-to-wait-to-borrow-a-new-e-book-from-the-library.
54
While efforts like LOCKSS and CLOCKSS exist for preservation, these often require publisher or copyright
owner approval for inclusion. While academic publishers have generally been willing partners, this cannot be said
for the majority of all publishers.
55
Report of the House Commerce Comm., H.R. Rep. No.105-551, Part 2 (2d Sess. 1998) at 24.
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departed from that balance, as Congress allowed industry fears of widespread piracy to overrule
centuries-long principles.56
The mechanism through which the legislature decided to protect digital works was to
provide them with additional protections, above and beyond copyright: they enacted civil and
criminal penalties for circumventing technology, assisting others to circumvent technology, or
damaging copyright management information.
The acts prohibited under the anti-circumvention provisions are described in §1201:
(a) Violations regarding circumvention of technological measures.-(1)(A) No person shall circumvent a technological measure that
effectively controls access to a work protected under this title….
(b) Additional violations.--(1) No person shall manufacture, import,
offer to the public, provide, or otherwise traffic in any technology,
product, service, device, component, or part thereof, that-(A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of
circumventing protection afforded by a technological measure that
effectively protects a right of a copyright owner …;
(B) has only limited commercially significant purpose or use other
than to circumvent protection afforded by a technological measure
that effectively protects a right of a copyright owner …; or
(C) is marketed by that person or another acting in concert with
that person with that person's knowledge for use in circumventing
protection afforded by a technological measure…57
And the prohibited acts related to copyright management information are found in §1202:
(a) False copyright management information.--No person shall
knowingly and with the intent to induce, enable, facilitate, or
conceal infringement-(1) provide copyright management information that is false, or
(2) distribute or import for distribution copyright management
information that is false.

56

Though the purported reason for the DMCA was the implementation of a WIPO treaty, legal scholars regularly
noted that the anti-circumvention provisions went beyond what the treaty required. Laura J. Robinson,
Anticircumvention Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 957, 958-60
(2003)
57
17 U.S.C. § 1201.
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(b) Removal or alteration of copyright management information.-No person shall, without the authority of the copyright owner or
the law-(1) intentionally remove or alter any copyright management
information,
(2) distribute or import for distribution copyright management
information knowing that the copyright management information
has been removed or altered without authority of the copyright
owner or the law, or
(3) distribute, import for distribution, or publicly perform works,
copies of works, or phonorecords, knowing that copyright
management information has been removed or altered without
authority of the copyright owner or the law...58
The penalties for violation of either of sections are substantial and are independent of any
damages awarded because of infringement. In other words, a user may be held liable under anticircumvention or copyright information management provisions even if they do not infringe on a
copyrighted work. The civil penalties related to §1201 include actual damages or statutory
damages up to “$2,500 per act of circumvention, device, product, component, offer, or
performance of service, as the court considers just” and up to $25,000 per each violation of §
1202.59 The criminal penalties include fines up to $1,000,000 or 10 years in prison.60
Despite the fact that copyright protects an intangible work, not a tangible copy of that
work, in this single piece of legislation, Congress granted greater rights to producers of certain
types of tangible copies over others as well as greater rights for many digital forms over analog
ones. In application, the prohibition against circumvention acts as a prior restraint on fair use.
Where a print copy of a work could be used freely under fair use principles, the digital equivalent
of that same work could not, not because copyright prevents it but because the additional statute
prohibiting circumvention criminalizes the act.61
The fear of piracy is inadequate to justify the sweeping nature of the DMCA. After all,
the Copyright Act itself provides a remedy through damages for infringement, including

58

17 U.S.C. § 1202.
17 U.S.C. § 1203. The amount of the award may be tripled if the act is repeated within 3 years of another violation
of the act.
60
17 U.S.C. § 1204. First offenses had a maximum $500,000 fine or up to 5 years in prison, and repeat offenders
faced the higher limits noted above.
61
One scholar believes that the prior restraint can be challenged under current law. “The wording of the statute here
opens the door for a court so inclined to evaluate the defendant's conduct and the effect of his using the subject
work. If the factors for exemption are present, then that defendant, notwithstanding his failure to fall within the
published regulations, may be able to prevail in arguing that he is exempt under the statute.” David Nimmer, A Riff
on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 673, 698 (2000)
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enhanced damages for willful infringement. The anti-circumvention solution instead erected a
barrier much wider than necessary to counter piracy, deterring as many, if not more, legitimate
uses than it did infringing ones. Libraries that wanted to migrate a work from an obsolete format
to a current one could not do so if the copy was protected by DRM. Purchasers of DVDs with
specific regional coding were prohibited from removing the coding to view the content that they
had purchased. Readers who wanted to view a purchased e-book on an application of their
choosing instead of the one dictated by the publisher could not do so.
Admittedly, Congress did try to reconcile fair uses with these new provisions by
including a few explicit exceptions (e.g., encryption research, interoperability) and by granting to
the Librarian of Congress the authority to set additional exemptions every three years.62 But the
latter mechanism does not prevent prior restraint. It simply creates a process to petition for an
exemption, allowing the restraint to be removed after review; that removal must be reaffirmed
each three years to remain in effect.
Note that criticizing the anti-circumvention provisions in the DMCA is not the same as
opposing digital rights management (DRM) itself. DRM can be implemented in any number of
ways – digital watermarking, encoding --- that do not upset the balance of copyright, so it is only
the DMCA text and implementation that is under discussion here. Certain DRM mechanisms
might be questionable, but most could be overcome if the DMCA did not grant extra protection
to them.
Industry Conglomerates’ Interests Overtaking Author and Public Interests
At the time of the nation’s founding, the intended beneficiaries of the Copyright Clause – authors
and users -- were roughly equal in stature, the first gaining benefits from what they created and
the second in what it consumed. Neither had any power over the other except in a single financial
transaction: the author’s setting of a price for the initial sale, and the user’s purchase of a copy at
the stated price. The main shapers of copyright today, though, particularly in the industries
reliant on individual use, fall into neither of those camps. They are instead the more powerful
interests of employers and publishers. These often multi-national entities have leveraged the
punitive aspects of copyright, the automation of technology, and their own power to tamp down
copyright’s private and public purposes.
Diminishing Copyright’s Private Interest (Author Revenue)
Industry Conglomerates act against the private author interest in four ways: allowing works to go
out of print while retaining control over publication (and therefore revenue streams), self-dealing
such that payments to copyright owners are below market rate, deploying new technologies for
greater exposure but lower royalty payouts, and closing off traditional revenue pathways.
62

17 U.S.C. §1201 (a)(1)(C). The current exemptions can be found at 37 CFR §201.40.
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Both literary and musical works generally have short commercial life-spans,63 so it is not
surprising that many go out of print when commercial interest is not considered adequate to
justify further production. However, the continued control over the work (through contract)
means that even if an author finds a new publisher or new market, she may have no ability to use
that work to generate income64. Instead, the work sits unused,65 failing both purposes of
copyright, neither generating income for the author nor contributing to the education or
entertainment of the public.
The second category is self-dealing. The development of global, multi-media
conglomerates, where a single entity has ownership interests in formerly vertical (e.g., publisher
v. distributor) or horizontal (e.g., competing bookstores) business relationships, has made
preferential treatment not only possible but likely. One such example is Fox’s dispute with the
artists and actors involved in the television show, Bones, where Fox had licensed the episodes to
its subsidiaries and others using preferential license terms (e.g., freemium streaming, where users
are not charged and rightsholders are not paid). According to an arbitrator, “Fox was self-dealing
when it sold the show’s digital rights to Hulu, potentially depriving the plaintiffs of millions in
extra fees.”66 Because Fox owned the rights to license and the artists contributing their work only
were entitled to royalties, the conditions encouraged Fox to maximize its benefits from the use of
the work without concern for the impact of reduced (or no) payments on its contributors.
Similarly, royalty calculations on streaming over purchase or single-work licensing have
resulted in lower payouts to most creators as compared to music purchases, though payouts vary
from platform to platform. One simplified comparison in 2013, for instance, determined that
where an artist normally would have received 7-10% of the amount paid for a song download,
they were receiving a fraction of a penny for each stream.67
Streaming itself is not the problem, as it presents additional options for author revenue
and exposure, as well as an alternative means of consumption for the user. But the entities
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William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471 (2003);
EDWARD RAPPAPORT, supra note 5 at 5–15.
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There is one narrow, statutory exception, that of the right of reversion contained in 17 USC §304(c), which
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controlling payouts have actively sought to keep payouts artificially low.68 Initially, this position
was “supported” by copyright law, as compulsory royalty rates for mechanical licensing69 – what
an entity had to pay for each physical copy (e.g. CD) it produced, which it was permitted to do
with or without the copyright owner’s approval once the work had been publicly distributed so
long as the compulsory license fee had been paid – had not caught up to technology and did not
apply to streaming. Later, publishers, artists, producers came to agreement on a standard
compulsory rate to apply to streaming,70 but that agreement did not stop platforms from
negotiating for even better rates, often keeping more of the income for itself than it would have
through compulsory licensing.71 Subsequent lawsuits claimed copyright infringement and/or
failure to pay out required royalties,72 with one report noting that Spotify failed to pay
approximately 21% of royalties owed.73
Further, platforms have sued to prevent increases in royalty rates74 and have exploited
loopholes in the Music Modernization Act,75 an act intended to establish fair statutory rates in the
current digital environment. In one such action in 2020, Spotify, Amazon, Pandora, and Google
won a lawsuit against the Copyright Royalty Board’s 2018 decision to increase the overall
percentage of revenue paid to songwriters from 10.5% to 15.1% over a five-year period.76
Spotify was the primary target of most protests, as their business model is built entirely on
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copyrighted music, and their reported income and profits so high77 that denying incremental
increases in income to the creators that made that profit possible seemed particularly offensive.
Eight Mile Style v. Spotify78 serves as another illustration of how Industry Conglomerates
have shaped copyright law to serve their own purposes. The alleged facts are these: Spotify (and
its licensing agent, the Harry Fox Agency (HFA)) failed to apply in a timely manner for a
compulsory license to use Eminem’s works (copyright owned by Eight Mile), it used these
works despite the lack of a license, it tried to cover up these actions to avoid penalties or the
higher royalty rates possible because of the failure to obtain a timely license, and it has attempted
to pay for only a fraction of the billions of times the works have been streamed.79
At least with respect to one song (Lose Yourself), Spotify had managed to avoid paying
Eminem for the use of his works by classifying it under “copyright control,” an internal
mechanism its agent used whenever a copyright owner could not be identified. Aside from the
difficulty in believing that an experienced music agency would be unable to identify the
copyright owner of an award-winning, top-charting song, Eight Mile claims to have past
correspondence with HFA on ownership and the appropriate revenue splits. In other words, HFA
knew the copyright owner and still designated the work as one in the “copyright control”
category, effectively authorizing use without proper payment of royalties.
Adding to the injury, Eight Mile noted that the terms of the MMA would ensure that
Spotify and HFA would never have to pay the price for deliberate and prolonged infringement.
For those works subject to the compulsory rates of the MMA, the Act replaced the usual
remedies --- including actual damages, statutory damages and attorneys’ fees --- with a mere
claim for royalties if a digital music provider is able to demonstrate compliance with a certain
subsection of the Act.80 Anyone who filed a lawsuit before December 31, 2017 could still avail
themselves of the former remedies, but those afterwards could not. Eight Mile has questioned the
constitutionality these provisions, noting that they retroactively deny remedies for a taking of a
vested property right.
That single provision in the MMA is only the tip of the iceberg, though. The MMA itself
was drafted primarily by Industry Conglomerates and resulted in a series of provisions that
benefited themselves at the cost of creators. The unusual circumstances surrounding creation and
the clauses themselves have been covered in-depth in other publications, but two examples of
their impact are these: (1) allowing accrued royalties for “unknown” works to be distributed to
entities other than the copyright owner after 3 years, and81 (2) reserving 10 of 14 voting seats on
the MMA’s collective licensing collective’s board of directors for music publishers, with the
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remaining four seats assigned to song writers.82 Commentators have noted that the ultimate
outcome of the MMA was to make publishers the determiners or who gets paid and how they get
paid.
The publishers have gone so far as to claim that if the writer of a
song doesn’t file a proper claim within 36 months of performance,
100% of the royalties from those streams will instead be paid to the
top publishers (and some of their biggest writers) via the world’s
largest “black box” of royalties…[T]he complicated organizational
structure it establishes pretty much ensures that a big pile of money
will end up in the black box, destined for distribution to the major
publishers based on their market share. It is highly unlikely that the
tens of thousands of independent self-published and unpublished
writers whose music is performed on Spotify and other digital
music services will ever get their fair share.83
Last, as noted in the section on Licensing, some publishers will not make their content
available to libraries, which harms the public in the form of access but also harms the author in
that there is less opportunity for the public to be exposed to their work.84
Frustrating Copyright’s Public Purposes
The harms to the public come in the chilling of innovation and the denial of fair uses. With every
new technology – photocopier, Betamax, web, search engines85 – Industry Conglomerates have
aggressively threatened litigation even when the uses in question were innovative, harm was
speculative, and the public good was evident. But litigation is not the only tool used, so this
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subsection will examine not just formal legal action but also two other practices against the
public interest: (1) suppressing automation even where it simply facilitates a user’s use of
purchased/licensed content and (2) using overbroad automated takedowns. Then, it will consider
how copyright’s statutory damages magnify chilling effects.
Preventing Reasonable Uses of Licensed/Purchased Materials
Industry Conglomerates have interceded quickly whenever automation potentially threatens their
income streams, even where the automation is intended to facilitate use by a person who has
already purchased or licensed a work. An example can be found in the attacks on automated
technologies useful for those with disabilities or different learning styles. Amazon has faced such
challenges at least twice. One of those actions may fall within the exemplars of a derivative
work,86 which complicates the analysis, but the instances in question differ from how the
exemplars were originally considered in the code, as they were not offered independently for
sale, only available with licensed content. In other words, the copyright owners would have
already been paid for the use of the work.
The first instance was in 2009, when the Kindle 2 introduced text-to-speech software that
could read licensed e-books to its authorized users. The Authors Guild objected, claiming
copyright infringement, and Amazon chose to deactivate the feature, instead giving each
copyright owner the option to enable the feature for their e-book.87 This was the case even
though the argument for infringement was poor. It was not a public performance of the work and
the audio feature could only be used on demand by individuals who had already acquired the
content. Even an argument that the audio was a derivative work would have been defeated, as a
derivative requires fixation to meet the definition and an on-demand reading that is not preserved
anywhere likely would escape its boundaries.
Later, in 2019, several publishers sued Amazon for infringement based on Audible’s
features, which essentially were the reverse of the ones in the earlier case—Audible provides
speech-to-text. The publishers’ claim was that Audible’s ability to display the text of a book as it
is being read (Audible Captions) creates a derivative work that competes with the market for
Immersion Reading, another product offered by Amazon requiring the user to buy both the audio
and text versions of a work.88 Though it had initially offered a fair use defense, Amazon/Audible
ultimately chose not to litigate to a conclusion but instead reached an agreement that it would not
enable this feature without publisher consent.89
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The result in both cases harmed users over all others. Text-to-speech capability better
serves the print disabled or even the physically disabled who may find it difficult to turn pages
(physical or digital). Speech-to-text helps those with learning disabilities, those that may not
learn well through speech but need to see words written out before them.90 Suppressing functions
that would have made it easier for these individuals to use a work that they had purchased91 (1)
undermines the Copyright Clause’s intent to use inventions and writings to advance the progress
of the sciences and the useful arts and (2) creates an unnecessary and illogical barrier to those
seeking to use copies of the works that they have legitimately acquired.
Amazon, at least during the most recent lawsuit, was both powerful and wealthy but still
capitulated. The costs of litigation92 and the potential of statutory damages93 make it even less
likely that entities with fewer resources will choose to resist similar assaults.
Libraries and Litigation
Libraries saw this same aggressive stance from Industry Conglomerates with technology’s use
with books in the Google Books, HathiTrust, and Georgia State cases.94 Despite the public
benefit, no demonstrated harm, and later evidence that the free or fair uses improves sales,95
publishers have continued to intimidate libraries engaging in arguably fair uses. The most recent
example is Hachette Book Group, Inc. et al v. Internet Archive,96 a lawsuit that in part challenges
the practice of Controlled Digital Lending (CDL). CDL is, at its heart, simply a shift in format. It
posits that if a library acquires a book in print, it can convert it to digital form and circulate the
90
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digital version in place of the print. It can never simultaneously lend any more copies that it
owned originally, and any digital copy has to be locked down so that it cannot be wholesale
copied or redistributed.97 The parameters for format shifting as outlined in CDL retain the
balance between the author’s interest and the public interest intended by copyright laws; the
author is paid at the time of the initial library acquisition, and the library uses only the number of
copies acquired to provide public access to the work.
Even libraries with good faith beliefs that their use is fair may be hesitant to undertake a
protracted and expensive battle98 because doing so means (1) committing to costly actions that
have an uncertain outcome (fair use outcomes are not predictable), and (2) diverting resources
from their intended use --- obtaining content for their communities – to legal defense.
Automated Takedowns
Any number of creators have used copyrighted works in fair uses, such as in criticism or parody
of a given work, and sites like YouTube, Vimeo, and TikTok are replete with examples of both
fair and infringing uses. Industry Conglomerates, in an attempt to catching infringement, have
created and implemented automated tools to catch and suppress not only of infringing uses but
also fair uses.
Computer algorithm systems that search the Internet for copyright
infringements enable copyright holders who hold thousands of
copyrights to identify and rapidly remove infringing material.
Some businesses choose to hire outside firms to do their policing,
yet some websites that host third-party material employ an inhouse automated process. Generally, the automated process
includes searching keywords related to the copyrighted content. If
alleged infringing material is identified, the system automatically
sends a takedown notice to the host of the material, generally a
website, in order to remove it from the Internet. If the host of the
material is, for example, YouTube, a copyright holder can have the
video removed in minutes if YouTube's own automated system
detects it as possibly infringing. Thus, the entire process from
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which a lawful video may be removed from the Internet can escape
human review.99
One particular practice that has come under fierce fire is the type of automation
used by hosting platforms like YouTube. Their version is called Content ID and
has resulted in any number of disputes over the validity of takedowns.
Since its launch, Content ID has received significant negative
attention because it has incorrectly matched thousands of lawful
videos as infringing on a copyright. Many uses of copyrighted
material are in fact completely legal, yet Content ID is unable to
distinguish lawful use from unlawful use. Accordingly, lawful
videos are removed or blocked without any human oversight if a
copyright holder has contracted with YouTube to block or remove
a video when a match is made. Given the fact that the process of
disputing a Content ID match favors the copyright holder rather
than the content creator, speech may go censored for weeks, even
years.100
Statutory Damages
Each of the three subsections above highlight a subversion of copyright, and that effect is
amplified when examining the consequences of threatened litigation and statutory damages.
Inequality in litigation, where the party with greater power or wealth can prevail even when their
substantive argument is weaker, is not unusual.101 Parties can and do overwhelm their opponents
with filings, documents in discovery, or frivolous charges. Resource-rich entities will always be
able to afford more personnel to research, pursue, and/or harass real or perceived infringers to
the point where it is simply easier for the other side to cease action.102
Unlike naturally occurring divides, though, copyright’s statutory damages is a
legislatively-created power imbalance, weighing heavily in favor of the copyright owner.
Legislative history shows that Congress had intended statutory damages to be largely
compensatory and simply offered them as an alternative accounting measure when it would be
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difficult to calculate actual damages.103 Congress explicitly noted that these types of awards
“shall not be regarded as a penalty.”104 Had litigants and courts resorted to statutory damages in
only in instances where harm could not be quantified, there would be little concern. But, litigants
have asserted claims in the millions even when harm is at best speculative and at worst known
not to exist.105
One need only look at past music file sharing cases against individuals to see how
aggressively statutory damages can be used to intimidate and terrorize. One case found a single
user, Jammie Thomas-Rasset, liable for $1.92 million for downloading 24 songs, and another
claimed that a senior citizen who only used a computer incompatible with the relevant peer-topeer file sharing software had used the software to infringe on copyrights.106 The examples here
are not offered as actual consequences, as in many cases, the damages were appealed and/or
remitted or the cases withdrawn or dismissed. They are proferred instead to demonstrate the
chilling effect of aggressive litigants who demonstrate more interest in deterring future conduct
than in justice.107 Had equity been the focus, the damages requested would have at most been the
cost of the number of works downloaded.
Why is this important? Because fair use by definition requires a case-by-case analysis. Its
body of law cannot evolve or adapt without individuals or organizations willing to explore its
limits. When litigation is so costly that an innovator has to choose between testing a new fair use
and bankruptcy, or a public provide choose between providing a public good and bankruptcy,
those willing to take the risk fall drastically. That threat is heightened where the innovator is a
non-profit entity and cannot count on income-generating activities as potentially offsetting any
costs of innovation.108 The stakes created by statutory damages often means that only the
wealthier, more powerful, or for-profit enterprises will be willing to test the limit or to defend
their uses in court. Weaker or poorer entities innovate but back down in the face of litigation
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even where they think that they are substantively right,109 and this harms innovation and the
advancement of society overall.
Re-righting Copyright
Anything short of complete copyright reform is unlikely to address the many imbalances in
copyright identified by scholars over the years,110 but there are smaller steps that could make a
significant difference in the specific instances described above. The subsections that follow
explore actions already in progress as well as new proposals for change.
Replace Statutory Damages
Statutory damages have moved far from their intent, becoming a hindrance instead of a help to
copyright itself. By revising statutory damages as many have suggested,111 a legislativelyprovided power imbalance can be eliminated and the overall power disadvantage in copyright
litigation can be narrowed.
Since the purpose of statutory damages --- to provide some compensation to a copyright
owner when actual damages cannot be proven --- is not what motivates the use of statutory
damages today,112 the provisions are ineffective for their articulated purpose. The simplest
solution is to eliminate statutory damages from the statute without any other alterations, and
arguably, this step would still be consistent with Congress’ initial intent. Since Congress had
stated that statutory damages were not intended to be punitive but litigants have used them
predominantly in that manner, elimination would simply be an acknowledgement that the
provision failed in application and therefore was unneeded.
Realistically, though, litigation and subsequent legislation have shown that there is
appetite and interest for some heighted measure of recovery when willful conduct is detected and
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damages cannot easily be measured. To properly reflect that interest, standards should allow for
punitive damages on top of actual damages. Any language should be calibrated properly to
reflect this specific interest as well as to protect fair use and innovation. It should act to deter
infringement that cannot be justified under one of the exceptions, particularly actions that make
commercial use of a copyright owner’s work without remuneration. But it also should not be
interpretable as punishment for innovators who may be working in gray areas especially where
they are engaging with new technologies.
Punitive damages are by definition not compensatory but instead designed to send a
societal message that a defendant’s recklessness, malice, or deceit will result in punishment
beyond any measurable damage. Common law and federal statutes awarding punitive damages
generally recognize that they can be awarded where “the defendant’s conduct involves reckless
or callous indifference to the plaintiff's federally protected rights, as well as when it is motivated
by evil motive or intent.”113
State tort law provides alternative reasons for punitive damages:
Punitive damages may be awarded for the purpose of punishment and for other
purposes such as (1) to deter a particular tortfeasor; (2) to deter others from
engaging in similar acts; (3) to provide additional compensation to sufferers from
a defendant's reckless and wanton conduct; (4) to encourage persons who have
suffered only nominal damages to sue those who conduct themselves
outrageously; (5) and to provide a substitute for personal revenge by the wronged
party114
Any of these standards would serve as suitable templates for punitive damages in
copyright infringement cases.
To prevent punitive damages from being used to deter innovation and public uses as
statutory damages have, though, the limits of applicability must be as clear as its requirements. In
addition to the requirements such as recklessness, malice or deception, the infringer has to have
harmed the market or the potential market for the work beyond just himself. Someone who
downloads a song for his own use, then, could be sued for actual damages (i.e., the market cost
of a copy of that song) but could not have punitive damages levied against him. The one
exception here may be for repeat offenders who have already been found liable but continue to
engage in the same behavior.
The harm to the market or potential market also has to be substantial. Under this
limitation, someone who makes a single copy of a work and gives it to a friend could still only be
held liable for the cost of one copy, whereas someone who uploads a copy to a pirate site for the
113
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world to download could be penalized with an award exceeding the cost of any copies
downloaded.
To provide extra protection to innovators and public uses, Congress should retain the
purpose of the second half of §504(c)(2) which currently reads:
The court shall remit statutory damages in any case where an infringer believed
and had reasonable grounds for believing that his or her use of the copyrighted
work was a fair use under section 107, if the infringer was: (i) an employee or
agent of a nonprofit educational institution, library, or archives acting within the
scope of his or her employment who, or such institution, library, or archives itself,
which infringed by reproducing the work in copies or phonorecords; or (ii) a
public broadcasting entity which or a person who, as a regular part of the
nonprofit activities of a public broadcasting entity (as defined in section 118(f))
infringed by performing a published nondramatic literary work or by reproducing
a transmission program embodying a performance of such a work.
Altering it to read:
The court may not award punitive damages in any case where an infringer
believed and had reasonable grounds for believing that his or her use of the
copyrighted work was a fair use under section 107.
This provision remains necessary because some fair uses could be undertaken willfully or
recklessly, elements that are usually used to determine culpability in punitive damages. After all,
since fair use is most commonly a defense, the defendant will almost always have knowingly and
deliberately engaged in infringement. By explicitly stating that those with a reasonable belief in a
fair use cannot be charged with punitive damages, Congress would send a clear signal that they
wish to protect the public interest. The expansion of the exemption to any actor instead of just
the three currently specified sends the same message, that fair uses are protected and anyone with
a reasonable claim of fair use should not be deterred from acting.
Reaffirm Format Neutrality
First sale, fair use, library uses…all of these public benefits have been eroded by Congress’
judgement that digital formats deserve greater protection than physical formats. This extra
protection is all the more puzzling because as technology advances, society has gained everyday
tools to turn physical formats into digital ones (e.g., scanner apps) so that even two digital copies
of a given work might be treated differently at law.
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Take, for example, an e-book from a publisher as compared to digital copy of that same
title scanned in by a user of a print copy. The format for each is digital, but the first will be
protected by publisher-DRM and therefore fall within the anticircumvention provisions of the
DMCA. Except in cases where explicit exceptions have been made, the user of that publisherprovided e-book will be unable to use the content of that book for fair uses. The user who made
their own digital copy, though, could use the digital copy for fair uses, providing that the
digitization of the print title was also a fair use. While there are instances where the initial
digitization would not be fair, at least in dicta, courts have indicated that reproduction could
indeed be a fair use where the legitimate owner of the title is making the reproduction for his
own personal use.115
If Congress restores format neutrality, copyright law and its associated rights will again
be tied to the work only. All formats would be treated the same, and different copies in the same
format will also be treated the same.
The first step toward reestablishing format neutrality would be to rewrite the anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA, as other scholars have suggested.116 While difficult
politically to do, the change itself is a fairly straightforward one. Congress cannot eliminate
circumvention laws entirely because of compliance issues with the WIPO Copyright Treaty, but
the relevant WIPO provision reads only
Contracting Parties shall provide adequate legal protection and effective legal
remedies against the circumvention of effective technological measures that are
used by authors in connection with the exercise of their rights under this Treaty or
the Berne Convention and that restrict acts, in respect of their works, which are
not authorized by the authors concerned or permitted by law117 (emphasis
added)
Lifting any prior restraints on circumvention, therefore, should keep the United States in
compliance with the treaty while also permitting fair use and innovation. Since fair use is
permitted by law, Congress could amend the statute applying fair use to circumvention as well as
infringement. In other words, someone circumventing technology for a fair use of a work would
be able to do so legally. No penalties would attach for circumvention unless the defendant
engaged in copyright infringement without a legal justification for it.
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Most, if not all, critical analyses of the DMCA have come up with the same goal but have
articulated different paths.118 The reason this article embeds the solution within the general
principle of format neutrality is because the flaw in the DMCA lies in treating the electronic
format as different from other formats; that same flaw exists in other aspects of copyright and all
should be addressed at the same time (see the second step below).
While copyright owners, the PTO, and the Copyright Office might all object to this
approach to the DMCA, emphasizing again the oft-repeated danger inherent in the rapidity with
which digital works can be transmitted, the example at the start of this section should illustrate
why the DMCA fails to address the concern. Other scholars have offered other reasons why the
DMCA has failed at its purpose:
The efficacy of the DMCA rests upon the assumption that
technological protections are a good way of securing copyrighted
works. However, this assumption is questionable for three reasons:
1) determined hackers will inevitably defeat DRMs, thereby
granting all users access to the underlying content; 2) holding
individual users liable under the DMCA is unlikely to change user
behavior in the aggregate; and 3) the DMCA cannot physically or
electronically prevent users from circumventing DRMs or
trafficking in circumvention technologies.119
Further, its failure is accompanied with its suppression of public uses, which means that it
has failed not one, but both purposes of copyright.
The second step to format neutrality would involve explicitly applying existing
exceptions, such as first sale, to all formats. Lawmakers’ and administrations’ unfamiliarity with
technology may have justified the conservative approach taken in earlier years, but that
understanding should now be informed by actual use. Piracy existed before copyright, survived
through every legislative enactment thereafter, and will continue despite future lawmaking
attempts. The reasons for this vary from practicality (e.g., inability to afford a legal copy), to
ignorance of the laws (e.g., how many users are actually aware of the DMCA’s penalties?), to
indifference to the laws (e.g., much like that felt for traffic laws), to outright scorn for any
regulation.120 Some have made the argument that the unique treatment of digital forms actually
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increases piracy, broadly defined, where the actors are either frustrated at not being able to
acquire a legitimate copy or are determined to be able to make what arguably is a fair use of the
title.121
There is simply no way to stop pirates, and pirating is done regardless of form.122 In
many cases, the source for pirated copies are actually hard copies of materials – scanned-in print
books, music ripped from CDs, movies ripped from DVDs or filmed live in theaters.123 Treating
the digital copy of the work as more vulnerable than the physical copy ignores the reality.
That said, studies have shown that piracy generally drops when reasonably-priced,
legitimate digital copies are readily available.124 And technologies such as blockchain or digital
watermarking have been developed that arguably would do a better job at controlling or
identifying misuse of copyrighted works than any legislation could. Today, there are much more
effective mechanisms to encourage respect for copyright’s principles than lawmaking. In such an
environment, is it really in society’s interest that a buyer of a print book can legally reconvey it
but that a buyer of the same content in electronic format cannot?
First sale should apply to all formats, and as long as the number of copies on the market
have not increased from the number legitimately authorized (or made under copyright
exceptions), infringement should not apply. It is true that relying on detection of infringement is
difficult, but one would argue that it is actually easier to detect infringing activity on digital
works than it is on print works. One could fairly easily make copies of physical items and resell
them under the radar, offline.125 Reselling items online often leaves digital footprints and
tracking can be automated. Depending on the tools used to scan or reproduce copies, the copies
may well hold personal information on the user and their location, information that would make
it possible for the copyright owner to investigate. The same cannot be said about physical copies
of books. Once made and distributed, they are unlikely to contain any identifying characteristics
leading back to the infringer. Similarly, digital watermarks could be used to see how many
copies are being generated from a single original copy. While privacy issues would need to be
addressed with the use of these technologies, each seems to hold more promise than the DMCA
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or similar legislation. Last, technologies like blockchain or CDL can be used to create secure
chains of conveyance similar to what is seen with analog items.126
State Legislation
Interestingly enough, the unique conditions of the pandemic brought to light many of copyright’s
imbalances, so much so that some states felt obliged to step in. When libraries and schools
became physically unavailable but some publishers still refused to license e-books to libraries,
states realized that the public interest was inadequately safeguarded by Congress and they
contemplated action of their own. To avoid preemption challenges, these states targeted
contracting rights – rights that fall squarely to the states – instead of directly invoking copyright.
At least three states (Maryland, Rhode Island, and New York) have proposed legislation
requiring that publishers license e-materials to libraries if they already license those titles to the
general public.127 Specific language from each state is below:
Maryland:
A publisher who offers to license and electronic literary product to
the public also shall offer to license the electronic literary product
to public libraries in the state on reasonable terms that would
enable public libraries to provide library users with access to the
electronic literary product.128
Rhode Island:
6-58-2. License to libraries and schools.
Any publisher who offers a contract or license for acquisition of
electronic books and digital audiobooks to the public shall offer to
license such books to libraries and to elementary and secondary
schools and educational institutions in the state on reasonable
terms that would permit the libraries, schools and educational
institutions to provide their users and students with access to such
electronic books.129
New York:
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Any publisher who offers to license electronic books to the public
shall offer to license such books to libraries in the state on
reasonable terms that would permit the libraries to provide their
users with access to such electronic books.130
In all three states, there is bipartisan support, and in Maryland, the bill passed both
chambers unanimously. As each bill sits in different phases in their respective legislative
processes, the effectiveness of such laws is yet to be known. Each known bill seeks more
equitable access to information via libraries than is available today, but they also have significant
deficiencies.
All use “reasonableness” as a standard without an objective test, so litigation will be
necessary to test its contours. Any benefits may be long delayed depending on how willing
Industry Conglomerates are to set high prices and how willing libraries will be to sue for
compliance where the outcome is uncertain. Hypothetically, is it reasonable to charge libraries
three times the cost to individuals? Five times? Ten times? And will libraries, who have no funds
for litigation, sue to challenge a specific publisher's cost as reasonable especially if accepting the
license cost is less expensive in the short-term?
Unfortunately, even under the most favorable application, all these legislative texts do is
address a subset of harms, failing to close off the additional avenues publishers have already
used in limiting access to these works (e.g., limits on number of uses). And, of course, even if
these states are successful in their efforts, that success is necessarily limited only to the states
that enact such legislation. There is no protection for the nation’s public interest without action
by Congress or our courts.
Regulation or Private Litigation
Suggested actions for Congress were covered in an earlier subsection, so this subsection looks to
independent pathways through administrative offices or the courts include using preemption,
misuse, or antitrust to invalidate contract provisions that use copyright to undermine its intended
public interests.131 Of these, only antitrust has thus far garnered the attention of the federal
government.132 Each argument, like the state efforts above, targets only the public interests

130

New York Senate Bill 2890 (2021), https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2021/s2890
Michelle M. Wu, Restoring the Balance of Copyright: Antitrust, Misuse, and Other Possible Paths to Challenge
Inequitable Licensing Practices (forthcoming LAW LIBRARY JOURNAL). Preliminary draft available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3811707
132
Publishers have been hit by various antitrust suits, ranging from price fixing to discriminatory pricing. Andrew
Albanese, Amazon, Big Five Publishers Face Yet Another Antitrust Suit—From Booksellers, Publishers Weekly
(Mar. 26, 2021), https://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/industry-news/publisher-news/article/85909amazon-big-five-publishers-face-yet-another-antitrust-suit-from-booksellers.html; AM. LIBRARY ASS’N, supra note
48.
131

37

reached through libraries and not other harms caused by publisher practice (e.g., elimination of
first sale). Each argument is set forth in brief below.
The preemption approach looks only to library licenses that seek to replace what
historically has been met through ownership (i.e., buying a book). Preemption would apply only
to nullify license terms that interfere with the exceptions to copyright found in sections 107 (fair
use), 108 (preservation and interlibrary loan), and 109 (lending) of the copyright code.
In relation to copyright, the scope of preemption as outlined in 17 U.S.C. §301 asks if the
work(s) in dispute falls within the subject matter of copyright (§§102, 103) and if the claimed
right(s) is within the rights (§106) that a copyright owner has been granted. If the answer to both
questions is in the affirmative, then state action on that right is preempted. As applied to
publisher-library licenses, preemption could be used to challenge clauses that limit the ability to
exercise the exceptions to copyright contained in §§107-109. These exceptions contain public
interest rights that are as meaningful as the rights that have been granted to the copyright owner.
How might a preemption claim work in practice? Any attempt would focus on specific
licensing terms (i.e., those that prohibit lending, interlibrary loan, preservation, or fair use),
unequal bargaining power, and would demonstrate how the terms trespass on Congress’
authority to determine copyright rights and restrictions. Congress chose to effect copyright in a
particular way that these license terms override, and this transparent attempt to negate public
rights should translate into the invalidity of the relevant license terms.
The antitrust angle is the most complicated of the three approaches mentioned but also
may be the easiest to win because of the hard data that is available for analysis. The American
Library Association’s Competition in Digital Markets outlines the following anticompetitive
behaviors by book publishers: refusal to make products available to libraries at any price
(Amazon), delayed sales to libraries (Macmillan), abusive and discriminatory pricing (Simon &
Schuster), leases for private use only (Netflix, Spotify), prohibition on preservation activities,
publisher consolidation leading to 45% of market power (presumptively illegal under Clayton
Act), pricing that outstrips inflation, bundling (e.g., Big Deals), unfair bargaining power due to
non-substitutable goods, and using market power to breach privacy.133 SPARC, in opposing the
merger between Cengage and McGraw-Hill, adds weight to these anticompetitive claims
specifically in the textbook market and raises additional questions about publishers elevating
prices to make up for reduced sales, suppressing secondary markets, engaging in unfair pricing,
coordinating price increases harmful to consumers, and privacy.134
The third avenue, misuse, is related to antitrust in that the elements of misuse are closely
aligned with antitrust claims of refusal to deal, unreasonable restraint on trade, or illegal
monopolistic conduct. However, misuse has a lower bar than antitrust so is offered as an
alternative should the antitrust process prove to be too burdensome. Lasercomb v. Reynolds
extrapolated from the patent misuse doctrine to develop the following description of copyright
misuse:
133
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The grant to the [author] of the special privilege of a [copyright]
carries out a public policy adopted by the Constitution and laws of
the United States, “to promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to [Authors] ... the exclusive
Right ...” to their [“original” works]. United States Constitution,
Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, [17 U.S.C.A. § 102]. But the public policy which
includes [original works] within the granted monopoly excludes
from it all that is not embraced in the [original expression]. It
equally forbids the use of the [copyright] to secure an exclusive
right or limited monopoly not granted by the [Copyright]
Office and which it is contrary to public policy to grant.135
(emphasis added)
As licenses are mechanisms protecting copyright works in a manner not intended by the
Copyright Act, the misuse argument would be used to force publishers to license e-books to
libraries.
Unfortunately, these attempts, even if successful, are limited in application or will take
such a long time to resolve that a great deal of harm will occur before resolution. An antitrust
ruling determining that any of the listed practices are illegal would send a message to the
relevant industry, but antitrust cases take on average three years to reach conclusion (before any
appeal)136. In other litigation, the ruling typically applies only to the parties involved. While
others may be able to benefit from stare decisis in later cases, that boon accrues only if the new
parties are willing to sue. It is, of course, possible that a ruling results in widespread change,
especially on matters such as preemption, but the possibility of change will depend heavily on
the facts of the case on which a court rules.
Libraries Reassessing Risk
As libraries and their communities have paid a disproportionate price under publisher practices,
it should come as no surprise that many of them have concluded that they need to develop
effective counter measures to retain the historic balance of copyright. Just as the pandemic
moved states to action, it similarly animated libraries.
Prior to the pandemic, the risk for libraries in copyright innovation lay in the potential of
litigation, both in terms of time and money, and most libraries determined that taking on any risk
that endangered their ability to meet their primary missions was unwise. Any undertaking that
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siphoned off money from collections or staffing or time from services therefore was backburnered. It was not as if risks to preservation and access (e.g., natural disasters) were
unknown,137 but they seemed distant or unlikely enough at an individual-library level that
addressing the risk was often not a high priority as compared to the endless immediate needs of
their communities.
And then, suddenly, every library in the nation closed because of the coronavirus. The
collections that libraries had spent billions to build were largely unavailable to their users at a
time when those collections were most needed, both for education and entertainment. Through
the lens of the pandemic, some libraries realized that taking strategic risks early equaled
protections against future harms and accordingly, failing to take those risks meant no escape
from harm when it fell.
Digitization serves as the example here, where an early, mass, collaborative and
coordinated digitization effort could have ensured uninterrupted access to most resources for all
of the nation’s libraries and users even during a pandemic or nation-wide natural disaster.
Libraries that engaged in digitization prior to the pandemic were able to maintain some access
for their users, though none had had the resources to have had digitized their entire collections by
the start of 2020. And no truly national, collaborative efforts had yet succeeded, though two
arguably come close.
The first is the Internet Archive (IA), which was at the forefront of the CDL movement,
having started to digitize and lend materials as early as 2010.138 By early 2020, they had millions
of titles digitized and still more in the pipeline. Even though they had encouraged collaboration,
and had long provided tools for libraries and publishers to enable collaboration, the number of
true collaborators, those that not only used IA’s Open Library but contributed to them as well,
was relatively small until recently. When the pandemic hit, many more libraries were interested
and willing to be full participants.
The second example is HathiTrust. The core digital collections in HathiTrust were
provided by the libraries that had partnered with Google on their Google Books Project early on,
though many additional collections have been added since its inception.139 Until the start of the
pandemic, use of the collection was greatly restricted. It allowed three uses: (1) anyone could
search the materials full-text, with results returning the titles and page numbers on which the
terms were found; (2) certified print disabled users could gain access to the full text; and (3) any
member library who owned a copy of the work could use a full-text copy as a replacement copy
under the same principles as articulated in 17 USC 108.140 Since the start of the pandemic,
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though, HathiTrust implemented what they called an Emergency Temporary Access Service
(ETAS), which in function mirrors the principles of CDL.141 Through ETAS, all member
libraries were able to access full-texts of works that their libraries owned in print. As evidenced
by the title, this service is intended only to be temporary, and applies only to “member libraries
that have experienced unexpected or involuntary, temporary disruption to normal operations,
requiring it to be closed to the public, or otherwise restrict collection access services.”142
Libraries that had not participated in CDL and were not interested in using the resources
above had little access to copyrighted online works other than what they could afford to pay
publishers for licenses to current e-books.143 Even then, licensing was not a particularly useful
solution even for the wealthiest libraries, as the majority of titles in library collections do not
exist in publisher-provided digital form anywhere.
Once the pandemic hit, many libraries, even those who had earlier been concerned about
risk, pivoted to adopt CDL, whether only for a narrow purpose (e.g., course reserves) or for their
full collections. Where staff were permitted to enter their facilities, even if patrons continued to
be prohibited, digitization workflows for CDL were rapidly developed and implemented. Prior to
the pandemic, there had primarily been a single platform for CDL – Adobe Digital Editions.
Once more libraries invested in the outcome, dozens of possible alternatives came to light, some
from modified existing document repository platforms (e.g., Google drive) and new ones from
library vendors (e.g., ImageAccess). Libraries developed both manual and automated ways to
ensure that lent items were locked down appropriately so that only a single user could use a title
at any given time.
Collaborative taskforces have since cropped up nationwide, both within existing
consortia (e.g., Virginia Academic Library Consortium)144 as well as in newly created groups
(e.g., Controlled Digital Lending Implementers)145. Even as libraries reopen, these efforts to
pursue CDL are intensifying, indicating a true shift in the view of risk for libraries. Developing a
measured approach to risk (and then taking action in accordance with such a plan) may
ultimately serve as the most effectively way to retain the balance of copyright, as it can serve as
a persistent reminder to Industry Conglomerates that the public interest is not without advocates
willing to fight for their rights under the Constitution.
Conclusion
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Across the board, every Industry Conglomerates action described in this paper harms all
communities. The damage is not equally borne, though, as every instance of limiting access
to information affects poorer communities more than they do wealthy ones and future
generations more than current ones, increasing the nation’s existing inequality divide. By
building strategies on profit, and undermining dissemination and preservation, publishers
have disrupted copyright’s purpose and have done so in a way that has not just held the
public interest in check but has actively harmed it.
With first sale eliminated, one cannot donate or sell materials at lower costs to people
or libraries unable to afford the initial price; society will only be able to retain access to
works as long as they can afford to pay repeatedly for the same content; and there is no
guarantee that any information available through licensing will exist beyond today.
While profit is normally a justifiable business reason for decision-making, it should
come under greater scrutiny when copyright is used for that profit, as the private grant of
copyright is conditioned on the public good. When profit undermines that public purpose,
Congress has the right and obligation to revoke the grant or take remedial steps to restore the
public good. Where Congress fails to act, states, public institutions, and the public generally
must take up the fight in their stead. In the past, this type of uncoordinated, multi-directional
pressure has been successful to overcome the seemingly insurmountable obstacles erected to
public benefit by self-interested, profit-driven industries.146 Without that vigilance and
constant pressure, the balance of copyright will continue to be undermined with the majority
of society paying a long-term price for its inattention.
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